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ABSTRACT 
The paper describes a theoretical approach to determine the downturn LGD for residential 
mortgages, which is compliant with the regulatory requirement and thus suited to be used for 
validation, at least as it can give benchmark results. The link between default rates and recovery 
rates is in fact acknowledged by the regulatory framework as the driver of the downturn LGD, but 
data constraints do not usually allow for direct estimation of such a dependency.   Both default 
rates and LGD parameters can anyway be related to macroeconomic variables: in the case of 
mortgages, real estate prices are the common driver. Household default rates are modelled inside 
a Vector Autoregressive Model incorporating a few other macroeconomic variables, which is 
estimated on Italian data. Assuming that LGD historical data series are not available, real estate 
prices influence on recovery rates is described through a theoretical Bayesian approach: 
possession probability conditional to Loan to Value can thus be quantified, which determines the 
magnitude of the effect of a price increase on LGD.  
Macroeconomic variables are then simulated on a five years path in order to determine the loss 
distribution (default rates times LGD per unit of EAD), both in the case of stochastic price 
dependent LGD and of deterministic LGD (but still variable default rates). The ratio between the 
two measures of loss, calculated at the 99.9th percentile for consistency with the regulatory 
formulas, corresponds to the downturn effect on LGD. In fact, the numerator of the ratio takes 
into account correlations between DR and LGD.   
Some results are presented for different combinations of average LGD and unconditional 
possession probability, which are specific for each bank. 
 
KEYWORDS: downturn LGD, default and recovery rates correlation, mortgage, Loan to 
Value, real estate price, possession probability, Bayesian approach, stress testing, Vector 
Autoregression 
 
 3
1. Introduction 
Basel 2 framework document requires that estimated LGD parameters must “reflect economic 
downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant risks”. In fact, the potential for 
realized recovery rates to be lower than average during times of high default rates may be a 
material source of unexpected credit losses for some exposures or portfolios. 
PD parameters are prudentially transformed inside the regulatory formulas, according to the 
hypothesis of a normal distribution of the underlying asset, of which the 99.9th percentile is taken 
for capital calculation. The same does not happen for the LGD parameter, which is thus required 
to be by itself conservative enough to be consistent with PD.     
Downturn LGD validation represents a challenging task. In fact, how to determine downturn LGD 
was not explicitly defined in Basel 2 document, thus leaving space for different methodologies to 
be developed and compared. Some further guidance (BCBS, 2005) went more into details, but still 
preferred a principle based approach, which identified the basic components or steps to be 
followed in the process of estimating the downturn LGD, namely: identifying the appropriate 
downturn conditions for each asset class and jurisdiction; identifying adverse dependencies, if 
any, between default rates and recovery rates; incorporating such dependencies in order to 
produce parameters which are consistent with identified downturn conditions. It was thus stated as 
a milestone that the relationship between LGD and default rates (and implicitly PDs, which should 
be correct estimators of default rates) should drive the downturn LGD calculation, and this 
represents a leading principle to be taken into account through validation. Still, limited data 
availability represents a challenge for downturn LGD estimation and validation, as it makes very 
difficult to transpose the regulatory indications into a best practice.  
Data constraints do in fact condition estimation of LGD in general, as it needs historical series 
covering the entire default duration for each exposure, and downturn LGD in particular. This in 
fact also requires to identify dependencies between parameters (LGD and DR) which are by nature 
different from each other, at least as far as time horizon is concerned.  
For mortgage portfolios specifically, historical losses are strongly downward biased because of the 
extremely favorable performance of variables like house prices and interest rates in the available 
observation window. This scenario has already experienced a downturn, but a time gap will elapse 
before recession effects can be incorporated into the LGD parameters estimates. Furthermore, the 
source of recoveries shows up to be relevant in order to understand the link between the economic 
cycle and losses on mortgage exposure, but the length of the observation window  is not enough 
for collecting a sufficient number of observations, under downturn conditions, on facilities 
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terminated by foreclosure on the mortgaged asset. It is thus difficult for a bank to directly obtain 
reliable internal estimates of all the required parameters using only internal data. 
Some alternative methodology should thus be used in order to determine the downturn LGD while 
still be compliant with the regulatory requirements. This represents an evolving area, which is 
expected to generate new approaches and to lead to new best practices in the sector. Up to now, 
the procedures used in practice can be retrieved to two main approaches: the ones which are based 
on future flow estimates under downturn conditions and the ones which stress LGD explanatory 
variables. The model which is outlined in the rest of the document can be inserted in this second 
stream of work.  
The link to macroeconomic variables is in fact established for both default rates and LGD: even if 
this is done according to two different models, the use of a common driver which is the real estate 
price allows us to stress the two parameters simultaneously, implicitly deriving a relation between 
them. 
The dynamics of macroeconomic variables (GDP, interest rates, real estate prices) and household 
default rates are modeled through a Vector Autoregressive model, built on quarterly data 
(paragraph 3). Once estimated, the model makes it possible to simulate the residuals (structural 
shocks) in order to get a joint distribution of the included variables. Householders default rate and 
real estate price are in this case crucial, as they are the key variables to establish the relationship 
between PD and LGD. 
As far as LGD is concerned, a theoretical approach is needed to overcome data constraints that 
prevent us from direct estimation (paragraph 4): the idea here is to catch the effect of real estate 
prices on LGD taking into account that the only recovery component they influence is the one 
derived from foreclosure termination. But linked to real estate value is also the weight attributed 
to this source of recovery, or the possession probability, which is in fact conditional on Loan to 
Value: a decrease in real estate value will reduce equity the borrower holds in the property, so that 
he will be encouraged to give the asset to the lender rather than repaying the debt. 
Again, direct estimation of possession probability dependency on Loan to Value is not usually 
possible due to data shortage. A Bayesian approach is thus followed here, whose parameters can 
be calculated on external or internal data.  
Simulated values of real estate prices are used to feed LGD calculation according to the outlined 
approach: this allows us to associate to each simulated value for default rate a simulated value for 
LGD (paragraph 5) and to multiply them in order to derive a loss distribution (per unit of EAD) in 
the case of stochastic (and correlated with PD) LGD. If a deterministic LGD value, e.g. equal to its 
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expected value, is used for calculating the losses corresponding to each simulated default rate, the 
resulting distribution will not take into account LGD sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions. 
The ratio between the 99.9th percentiles of the two distributions can be interpreted as the downturn 
effect on LGD, consistent with Basel 2 framework. 
The model as such seems to respect the regulator’s intention when addressing the problem of the 
margin of conservatism that should characterize LGD estimated parameters, at least as it takes into 
account the link between LGD and the credit cycle, while giving results that are perfectly suited to 
be inserted into the capital requirement calculation. 
In the present application, while the VAR model is estimated on Italian systemic data, the 
theoretical model for LGD is not given a parameterization relying on external or internal datasets. 
Rather, we preferred here to present results for a range of different, but realistic, values of 
expected LGD, possession probability and average LTV. This allows us to perceive the estimated 
downturn effect sensitivity to parameters that are specific for each bank. Also, the parameters, 
relying on a macroeconomic model that must be country-specific, can represent a benchmark to be 
used while validating LGD results, even if obtained through different methods and starting from 
different assumptions.  
 
2. Literature review 
The framework to which all studies on downturn LGD refer is the BCBS (2005) document, that 
aimed at providing guidance on how to meet the regulatory requirement that LGD parameters used 
in Pillar I capital calculations must reflect economic downturn conditions.  This defined some 
principles or guidelines to be respected, inside which all approaches, even if quite different from 
each other, can be collocated.  
Apart from theoretical works, some review of the practices which are actually followed is 
presented in the CEBS (2008) document on Basel II implementation issues.   
Being the dependency between default rates and recovery rates crucial for downturn LGD 
quantification, a first stream of literature directly analyzes the correlation, and  its implication on 
prociclicality and economic/regulatory capital calculation. This can be done on aggregate default 
rates and on the LGD implicit in corporate bond price after default. In this respect, Altman et al. 
(2005), find a positive correlation resorting to an econometric multivariate model which includes 
also macroeconomic indicators and some proxies of high-yeld bond market behavior. Among 
others, Dullman and Trap (2004) such as Hillebrand (2006), Barco (2007) all propose a model for 
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quantifying the dependence of recoveries and default rates on a common systematic risk: their 
estimations rely on single factor model and on time series collected from rating agency database. 
The present work uses two different approaches for modelling the effect of the economic 
conditions to respectively default rates and LGD.  
Thus, part of the literature that inspired it just concerns the relationship between default rates and 
macroeconomic variables through simultaneous equation systems or Vector Auto Regressive 
approach. In particular, Virolainen (2004) analyzed Finnish default data with a SUR model: 
sectorial default rates were simultaneously explained by GDP deviation from its trend, short 
interest rate and indebteness level.  
As far as Italian case is concerned,  Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) provided evidence of a link 
between Italian household arrears and some macroeconomic variables such as output gap, 
household indebtedness, inflation and short interest rate using a quarterly VAR model. Our results, 
although based on a slightly different time frame, variable selection and lag structure, appear to be 
quite consistent with their findings in terms of default rate dynamics and response to GDP and to 
interest rate. 
Hoggarth et al. (2005) explained the aggregate corporate and household bank’s write-off on UK 
data: for the latter they included real income, inflation rate, short interest rate and real estate 
inflation. Wong J. (2006) applied a VAR system to credit exposures of Hong Kong’s retail banks 
employing GDP growth, interest rate and property prices, the latter used to generate LGD values 
in an expected loss simulation exercise. More recently, Avouyi et al. (2009) found a quite robust 
relationship among French corporate default rates, GDP growth rate, short interest rates and 
corporate average spreads as market default predictors. 
The link of LGD on mortgages to the macroeconomic environment, as expressed by the real estate 
price, is here established by means of a theoretical model. The approach adopted to relate LGD 
and collateral value through foreclosure (possession) probability is supported by the Bank of 
Spain validation document (2007) and by an FSA (2008) survey meant to quantify downturn LGD 
on UK residential mortgage.  
As far as downturn LGD calculation is concerned,  the task usually consists in solving for the 
downturn LGD input so that it gives a value of regulatory/economic capital identical to the model 
with  systematically correlated default rate and LGD. Altman et Al. (2001), Miu and Ozdemir 
(2006), Chabaane et Al. (2004) but also some of the aforementioned authors, despite the use of 
different correlation structures and parameterization, explore this issue and outline the relevant 
impact of downturn evaluation. 
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3. The relation between default rates, real estate price and macroeconomic 
variables 
To analyze the transmission mechanism of macro-financial shocks to household default rates and 
real estate price, a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model was formulated. VAR models are 
generalized form of simple autoregressive process for n variables: they allow to investigate mutual 
relationship among variables even in case of time series non-stationarity: 
tptptt YYSCY εβ +⋅Α++⋅Α+⋅+= −− ...11                           [3.1] 
In [3.1] representation, C is a constant vector, S a matrix of seasonal dummy variables, β and Ai 
are matrices of parameters, εt a vector of correlated residuals/shocks. Yt is the vector of 
endogenous variables including the household aggregate default rates (transformed in Logit), the 
Italian real GDP (linearly detrended), the log changes in real estate price index and the short term 
interest rate (logarithm of three month Euribor rate)2.  
Figure 1: Macroeconomic variable used in VAR system 
Household default rate trasformed in Logit
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Real GDP linear detrended
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Log differences of real estate price
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
D
ec
-9
0
D
ec
-9
1
D
ec
-9
2
D
ec
-9
3
D
ec
-9
4
D
ec
-9
5
D
ec
-9
6
D
ec
-9
7
D
ec
-9
8
D
ec
-9
9
D
ec
-0
0
D
ec
-0
1
D
ec
-0
2
D
ec
-0
3
D
ec
-0
4
D
ec
-0
5
D
ec
-0
6
D
ec
-0
7
Log of 3 month Euribor rate
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Modeling the dynamics of the aforementioned macroeconomic variables using a VAR has the 
advantage that impulse response analysis can be figured out: once the system parameters are 
estimated, it becomes possible to simulate a number of shocks to the macroeconomic variables 
                                                 
2 Inside household default rate equation, three point dummy variables on 1996Q2, 1999Q4 and 2000Q4 were 
introduced for the estimation: the aim was removing the detected outlier effect during these three mentioned quarters. 
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and consider the feedback from these shocks to the householder default rates and real estate price. 
In this work, the latter are in fact the key variables to establish the relationship between PD and 
LGD. 
The time series used for the VAR estimation are quarterly and extend from 1990 second quarter to 
2007 fourth quarter3, resulting in 71 available observations depicted in Figure 1. As mentioned 
before, each variable was treated as follows: 
 - a Logit transformation for Italian household default rate (LHDR) was set in order to limit its 
range between 0 and 1. The default rate is collected by Bank of Italy and can be defined as the 
ratio between the number of Italian loans classified as bad debts in the reference quarter and the 
number of performing loans outstanding at the end of the previous one; 
- Italian real GDP was detrended (GDPdet) using a linear trend from 1990_Q2 to 2009_Q3: the 
new computed variable can also be called output gap, which is frequently used in the empirical 
literature aimed to explain the default rate behavior, as the ability of agents to service their debt; 
- real estate price index (based on the average price of Italian dwelling) was expressed in terms 
of log differences (ΔLogRE). This variable is crucial in explaining household default rate: in fact, 
real estate represents the major source of collateral and so, if its value declines, the incentive to 
continue servicing the debt will weaken; 
- finally, three months Euribor rate was expressed in logarithm (LogR3M) and directly affects 
the burden of the debt. 
Uniroot tests such as Augmented Dickey Fuller and KPSS were conducted and all the selected 
variables appeared to be non-stationary (see tables A1 and A2): since Johansen Cointegration test 
performed on the system (see table A3) did not reject the existence of one cointegrated 
relationship, it is most likely that any stochastic common trend will be picked up by the VAR.  
As far as the estimation technique is concerned, OLS method was used and 3 time lags (p=3) were 
chosen on the basis of AIC (Akaike Info Criterion) and HQC (Hannan-Quinn Criterion) lag 
selection tests (see table A4). 
The impulse response functions provide a detailed picture of the dynamics of the variables. Figure 
2 shows the impulse responses of each variable to one standard deviation shocks of the others: 
since variance-covariance matrix of VAR residual/shocks4  is unlikely to be diagonal, the residuals 
need to be orthogonalized, e.g. using a Cholesky decomposition as done in this case.  
This kind of analysis visually suggests some dependencies among the variables: 
                                                 
3 2008 and the first three quarters of 2009 were excluded from the estimation sample to perform on them out-of-time 
tests. 
4 Besides, et residuals appear to follow a Gaussian distribution as confirmed by Jarque-Bera tests in Table A5, except 
for real estate which tends to reject the normality assumption at 5% confidence level. See Figure A1 for their 
graphical representation. 
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions with +/- two standar error bands 
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 default rate (Logit DR) depends negatively (positively) on real GDP shock and decreases 
(increases) significantly within the first four quarters;  
 a positive shock in real estate returns implies a significant reduction in household default 
rate;  
 the response of default rate to short term interest rate is positive and rather significant after 
the fourth quarter; 
 as far as GDP is concerned, there is evidence of a strong negative relationship with short 
term rate; 
 the real estate returns response is positive with respect to GDP and negative to interest 
rate: looking at +/-2 standard errors bounds, the feedback effect of default rate can’t be 
strongly supported;  
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 finally, what emerges from the last group of pictures is a positive reaction of interest rate 
to real GDP. 
Table 1 and 2 indicate the percentage of the forecasting errors explained by each variable at a 
given time horizon for householder default rate and real estate price changes, also known as 
variance decomposition: 
Table 1: Logit(Default Rate) variance decomposition 
Forecast horizon  LHDR  GDPdet  ΔLog(RE) LogR3M 
1  100%  0%  0%  0% 
2  94%  3%  3%  0% 
3  85%  7%  7%  1% 
4  75%  12%  9%  3% 
5  69%  16%  9%  6% 
6  61%  19%  9%  12% 
7  52%  19%  10%  19% 
8  45%  19%  10%  26% 
The default rate variable is mainly explained by the default rate itself: at the fourth quarter 
horizon, 12% of LHDR forecast error is explained by GDP, 9% by real estate and 3% by interest 
rate. After 2 years, a reduction in LHDR power can be observed, in favor of the other 
macroeconomic variables, with a slight predominance of short term Euribor 
Table 2: ΔLog(RE) variance decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2, the high persistency of Δlog(RE) in explaining itself can be noticed: however, at the 
eighth quarter time horizon real GDP appears to be the second powerful variable with 14% 
explained variance. 
An out of sample exercise on the VAR model was also conducted in order to check for its 
robustness through the last downturn period, experienced during the years 2008 and 2009.  
Figure 3 depicts the dynamic one-quarter ahead forecast (the “true” out of sample observations are 
used for lagged value in the system) for each variable, starting from the last quarter of 2007. 
 
 
Forecast horizon  LHDR  GDPdet  ΔLog(RE) LogR3M 
1  0%  0%  100%  0% 
2  0%  3%  96%  0% 
3  2%  7%  91%  0% 
4  1%  11%  86%  1% 
5  1%  12%  83%  3% 
6  1%  13%  80%  5% 
7  1%  14%  76%  9% 
8  2%  14%  73%  12% 
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Figure 3: Dynamic one quarter ahead forecast with 95% error bands5 
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As shown in the graphs, the forecasted time frame can be deemed as a factual structural break, 
especially for real detrended GDP, which fall down to around -8% causing an overestimation 
(underestimation) of household default rates (Logit): this results in observed default rates (Logit) 
lying near the lower (upper) 95% confidence bounds, which however grant a conservative forecast 
of the model in case of severe recession phases. 
Finally, iterating forward the VAR system several times with the information set at 2007_Q4, we 
found a converging long run solution for each variable shown in table 3 and 4 (in which LHDR 
was transformed into default rate HDR and LogR3M into the three-month Euribor rate R3M): 
Table 3: Quarterly long run solution 
Quarter  HDR  GDPdet  ΔLogRE R3M 
1  0.30%  0.08%  0.64%  3.42% 
2  0.32%  0.01%  0.53%  3.43% 
3  0.29%  0.06%  0.21%  3.43% 
4  0.37%  0.04%  0.38%  3.45% 
                                                 
5 The black line represents the observed variable, the grey the forecast; segments indicate the 95% confidence bounds. 
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Table 4: Long run solution: annualized values 
HDR  GDPdet  ΔLogRE R3M 
1.28%  0.05%  1.76%  3.43% 
Since the outcomes frequency is quarterly based, with dummies seasonal effect (variable S in 
equation [2.1]), household default rates and real estate returns were transformed to hold a one-year 
time horizon6 (see Table 4). 
 
4. A Bayesian approach to assess LGD and real estate prices connection 
Recovery flows, which determine the observed LGD once a default cycle is closed, are not all 
deriving from the same source. For the purpose of our analysis, the relevant distinction is between 
recoveries deriving from foreclosure on the mortgage asset, i.e. the sale of the real estate property, 
and other sources of recovery (e.g. the counterparty paying back part of his debt in order to protect 
his investment, or cured positions).  
From the bank point of view, only the first recovery source is affected by a change in real estate 
prices. But its weight on LGD depends on possession probability (or foreclosure probability), 
which in turn depends on Loan to Value.  
To quantify the sensitivity of residential mortgage Loss Given Default to the systematic risk 
movements, an equation that establishes the relationship between LGD random variable7 and real 
estate price should be formulated8: 
( ) ( ) PoLGDrePoLGDreLGD tt reLTVPoPtreLTVPoPt |]11[)%,|(1%| %,|%,| ⋅−+Δ⋅=Δ ΔΔ       [4.1]                  
{ }   rePoLGD rePoLGD tt 0,)]%1()|1(1[max)%,|( Δ+⋅−−=Δ                     [4.2] 
where: 
 ( )treLTVPoP %,|1 Δ  is the possession random variable, which takes 1 with probability 
)%,|( treLTVPoP Δ   and 0 otherwise (Po stands for possession event, LTV  represents the Loan 
To Value random variable on defaulted loan portfolio, tre%Δ  is the real estate percentage 
change at time t); 
                                                 
6A survival probability rule was adopted for DR: ∏ = −=−4 1 1)1(q q HDRHDR . Quarterly real estate returns were 
capitalized within the year ∏ = Δ+=Δ+4 1 1)1(q q LogRELogRE . GDPdet and R3M were averaged within the 
year. 
7 Capital letter indicates the random variables, small letter their realizations. 
8 Approach  also suggested by the Bank of Spain (Banco De Espana (2007)) for downturn LGD estimation. 
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 )%,|( treLTVPoP Δ  is the possession probability conditional to Loan To Value and to 
systematic factor tre%Δ . If LTV decreases, borrowers will have more equity in the property 
(collateral) and the probability of forced sales or foreclosure will reduce since they can raise 
money or guarantee to preserve their investment. If LTV exceeds 100% for instance because of a 
sharp downturn in real estate market, the negative equity will encourage borrowers to loose the 
property and let the lender to recover through foreclosure. Thus, during a downturn phase, the 
proportion of defaulted facilities expected to be terminated by foreclosure will be much higher 
than the long run rate9: tre%Δ  works in fact as systemic risk modifying the mean of LTV 
distribution. 
 )%,|( trePoLGD Δ  is the LGD conditional to foreclosure termination and to tre%Δ  realization 
as in [4.2];  
 PoLGD |  is the LGD conditional to foreclosure termination observed in the long run period. Its 
distribution should be estimated by the bank, exploiting the defaulted positions database 
(including the costs of foreclosure procedures); 
 PoLGD |  is the LGD conditional to the final “cure” of defaults or other situations 
complementary to foreclosure such as further borrower flows after default. By assumption it  
does not depend on real estate market behavior. Also in this case, its distribution can be figured 
out by banks non-performing loans dataset; 
 tre%Δ  is the percentage change in real estate price coming from tRE%Δ distribution10, 
evaluated by means of VAR model described in the previous paragraph which affects both  
)%,|( treLTVPoP Δ  and )%,|( trePoLGD Δ as stated in equations [4.1] and [4.2]; 
Now, since our focus is to model the systemic behavior of stochastic LGD, if we assume a fully 
granular defaulted loan portfolio following the strong law of large numbers and consider the 
conditional independence between possession event ( )treLTVPoP %,|1 Δ  and )%,|( trePoLGD Δ  
variates, equation [4.3] holds: 
)|()]%|(1[
)%,|()%|()%|(
PoLGDErePoP                                                                        
rePoLGDErePoPreLGDElgde
t
tttt
⋅Δ−+
Δ⋅Δ=Δ=
            [4.3]             
                                                 
9 The use of LTV as a key variable for the modeling of possession probability is consistent with the option theory 
approach (see for instance Van Order, R. (2008)) used for valuing debt, whereby the equity holders (household in this 
case) are considered to hold a put option on the value of the collateral where the strike price is debt. The rationale is 
that if the asset value falls below the debt value the equity holders are better off by giving the asset to the lenders 
rather than repaying the debt. 
10 Here, the percentage changes correspond to log differences used in VAR system. 
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It describes the whole portfolio LGD (elgdt) conditional to the macroeconomic environment in t: 
)%,|( trePoLGDE Δ and )|( PoLGDE  are the average portfolio LGD conditional respectively to 
possession and non-possession events, )%|( trePoP Δ is the average possession probability across 
all the counterparties. Here, the main insight is that, given a certain economic cycle realization, 
total LGD results in the sum of the average LGDs conditional on different types of termination, 
weighted by their respective probabilities of occurrence. Real estate channel will affect both the  
)%,|( trePoLGDE Δ , by increasing or decreasing the collateral value (see [4.2], replacing 
PoLGD |  with )|( PoLGDE  in the right side), and the average possession probability 
)%|( trePoP Δ  through Loan To Value distribution change in mean. 
As far as )%,|( treLTVPoP Δ  is concerned, it could be estimated on internal data, if available, by 
logistic approach, using the 0/1 event of foreclosure as dependent variable and LTV coupled with 
other variables as independent. If internal loss data are not complete enough to yield to such an 
estimation (that is, if a sufficiently long historical window containing observations under 
downturn conditions and a sufficient number of facilities terminated by foreclosure are lacking in 
database), a Bayesian approach could be useful, possibly resorting to external data source: 
)](1[),,()(),,(
)(),,(
)|(
PoPLTVfPoPLTVf
PoPLTVfVLTPoP
PoPoPoPoPoPo
PoPoPo
−⋅+⋅
⋅= σμσμ
σμ
            [4.4]                     
)|( VLTPoP  is the long run possession probability conditional to LTV distribution. The 
denominator, that is the long run unconditional LTV distribution ),,( σμLTVf , can be obtained 
from internal data, fitting the empirical distribution or using a parametric density (Normal, 
Lognormal, Beta) with mean (μ) and variance (σ) corresponding to observed LTV statistics. The 
first component of numerator, which represents the long run LTV distribution conditional to 
foreclosure event, could be computed by examining historic possessions from external source or 
by some reasonable and prudential assumption about internal LTV distribution. Finally, )(PoP , 
defined as the long run possession probability (prior in Bayesian formulation), can be based on 
internal figures, on recession-based forecasts or again on external data statistics. 
In order to determine )%|( trePoP Δ in equation [4.3], and thus to incorporate a time-dependency 
behavior in )(PoP , we admit time-dependence only via the change in mean of unconditional LTV 
density11:  
                                                 
11 See Tashe (2006), according to which it is possible to deal with cyclical effect modifying (shifting) either the 
unconditional distribution as we did or the prior. In the latter case we should have enough historical information and 
data to develop a model aimed at P(Po) forecasting. 
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dLTVreLTVfLTVPoPrePoP tt ⋅Δ+⋅=Δ ∫∞
0
),)%1(,()|()%|( σμ                    [4.5] 
while if tre%Δ  = 0 we catch exactly the average long run foreclosure probability 
dLTVLTVfLTVPoPPoP ⋅⋅= ∫∞
0
),,()|()( σμ  
In this fashion, economic up or downturns are only reflected by a shift of the LTV distribution 
towards the best or worse LTVs. 
Figure 4: Long run f and fPo distributions used  
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In the present work, to describe the unconditional LTV density, we adopted a lognormal 
distribution with mean and standard deviation respectively equal to 70% and 50% (although 
further tests with 50%, 60% and 80% μ values, leaving the volatility fixed, were implemented), 
trying to render a typical long run LTV distribution at default, on an Italian mortgage portfolio. 
Concerning the foreclosure conditional LTV, the same distribution was prudentially shifted in 
order to reach a 100% μPo value (Figure 4), assuming that borrowers are willing to loose the 
property when LTV amounts to 100% on average. The left side of this distribution (LTV < 100%), 
referring to positive equity positions, encompasses for unexpected events that make it difficult to 
avoid forced sales such as job loss, a significant change in health status, and changes in family 
structure (see Qi, M., Yang, X. (2007) for more details about LTV relevance in LGD estimation). 
Regarding P(Po), some options were experimented: following the shape of the two 
aforementioned distributions and thus equation [4.4] for long run possession probability, it was 
assumed alternatively being equal to 30%, 35% and 40% (see Figure 5). 35% is the median value 
for possession probability derived from a Financial Services Authority study (FSA 2008), 
conducted on a sample of  10’000 UK mortgage residential exposures.  
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Figure 5: P(Po | LTV) with P(Po) set to 35%, μ = 70%, μ o = 100%, σ = σPo = 50% 
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For the sake of simplicity, although banks should distinguish between )|( PoLGDE  and 
)|( PoLGDE  inside [4.3], for this exercise a unique value of long run LGD was adopted (ELGD), 
assuming that on average (i.e. in the long period where also tre%Δ = 0), the bank recovery process 
is able to guarantee )|( PoLGDE  and )|( PoLGDE  neutrality. Furthermore, from a 
computational point of view, equation [4.5] was determined by numerical integration. 
 
5. Quantifying downturn LGD through simulation 
After having defined a macroeconomic model for household default rates and collateral value 
(approximated by real estate price index changes) and properly quantified the sensitivity of LGD 
to collateral movements, the algorithm described here explains the main steps adopted to compute 
the downturn LGD (DLGD). The aim is to incorporate, by means of VAR system simulations, any 
adverse dependency between default and recovery rates into the DLGD. 
Let’s define the loss of an infinitely granular portfolio with unit exposure and stochastic LGD as: 
ttt LGDEHDRYL ⋅=|                                                       [5.1] 
HDRt is the aggregate household default rate random variable at year t, whose dynamics depends 
on the quarterly VAR system estimated before (yt VAR realizations), ELGDt is the portfolio Loss 
Given Default at t, also depending on VAR and particularly on real estate price changes through 
equation [4.3]. 
The [5.1] can be compared to the loss with deterministic LGD set to its downturn value 
tDLGD )(α , computed for each t: 
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ttt DLGDHDRYL )(|
* α⋅=                                                  [5.2] 
Since our aim is to capture in downturn LGD all the risk coming from the HDR-LGD correlation 
and thus to compensate for the fact that regulatory capital calculation does not incorporate 
systematic LGD, the α (e.g. set to 99.9% following Pillar I regulatory formula) quantiles of L|Yt 
and L*|Yt should be equated and then solving for tDLGD )(α :   
]|[]|[ * tt YLqYLq αα =  
ttt DLGDDRqYLq )(][]|[ ααα ⋅=  
][
]|[
)(
t
t
t DRq
YLqDLGD
α
αα =                                                     [5.3] 
Dividing [5.3] by ELGD, a measure of downturn LGD mark-up ν(α)t is figured out: 
ELGDDRq
YLqv
t
t
t ⋅= ][
]|[
)(
α
αα                                                     [5.4] 
The algorithm to compute the percentiles qα and thus ν(α)t can be summarized as follows: 
1) Simulation of the VAR system over a five years period, that is a 20 quarters economic 
scenario. Yt,q random variables (t stands for years and q for quarters)  are generated starting 
from their long run values (Table 3) and drawing normally distributed et,q shocks: since 
their correlation matrix was discovered to be not statistically significant, as shown by the 
large value of the computed standard errors (Table A6), they  were drawn as independent; 
2)   transformation of default rate and real estate return horizon from quarterly into annual. 
Household default rates were transformed using a simple survival probability rule: 
∏ = −=−4 1, , 1)1(qt tqt HDRHDR                                            [5.5] 
      where q is the quarter number from 1 to 4, t indicates the year from 1 to 5. 
      For real estate, the annual increase of average simulated prices as indicated by [5.6] was 
adopted: 
)%1( 1,11,1 ==== Δ+= qtqt RERE    
 )%1( 2,11,12,1 ====== Δ+⋅= qtqtqt RERERE  
... 
)%1( 4,53,54,5 ====== Δ+⋅= qtqtqt RERERE  
1/% ,1, −=Δ − qtqtt RERERE                                            [5.6] 
3) computation of annual HDRt, LGDt and thus L|yt for t going from 1 to 5 (years); 
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4) the iteration of steps 1-3 (in this case 30’000 iterations) allows to compute percentiles 
qα(HDRt), qα(L|Yt), and as a consequence tDLGD )(α  and ν(α)t. 
As it can be noticed, the simulation described above is run on a five years time path, which is a 
length consistent with a full economic cycle, starting from long period values: however, the 
calculated downturn LGD time horizon is still annual since the algorithm provides for a one-year 
theoretical loss due on real estate prices changes. The lengthening of the simulation horizon serves 
the objective to let the simulated economic system take all plausible real-world values smoothing 
the persistence of the starting, long period, values. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the results of the simulation related to one-year household default rate 
(HDRt), annual change in average real estate price (ΔRE%t) and LGDt: the outcomes are displayed 
in terms of percentiles at risk (95%, 99% and 99.9%), for each simulation year.  
Regarding real estate price (Table 6), the percentiles are computed prudentially removing the long 
run trend specified in Table 3 and 4 and thus adding a margin of conservatism in describing real 
estate price dynamics. 
As far as LGD is concerned (Table 7), its calculation was done assuming an ELGD equal to 15%, 
with μ = 70% and a prior for possession probability P(Po) equal to 35%: to be noticed is the 
maximum increase in LGD value from 15% to 20% during the fifth year, which corresponds to a 
percentage change of about 33%. 
Table 5: Percentiles of one year household Default Rate (HDRt) 
    Simulated years starting from long run period 
α LR   1  2  3  4  5 
95%  1.28%  1.46%  1.62%  1.79%  1.96%  2.12% 
99%  1.28%  1.55%  1.78%  2.05%  2.33%  2.58% 
99.9%  1.28%  1.65%  2.02%  2.47%  2.85%  3.30% 
 
Table 6: Percentiles of one-year changes in Real Estate price (ΔRE%t) 
  Simulated years (t) starting from long run period 
α 1  2  3  4  5 
95%  ‐1.85%  ‐4.24%  ‐5.72%  ‐6.65%  ‐7.17% 
99%  ‐2.61%  ‐5.94%  ‐8.08%  ‐9.30%  ‐10.03% 
99.9%  ‐3.46%  ‐7.81%  ‐10.79%  ‐12.25%  ‐13.35% 
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Table 7: Percentiles of ELGDt distribution with P(Po) = 35% (unconditional 
forclosure probability), ELGD = 15%, μ = 70%, μ o = 100%, σ = σPo = 50% 
    Simulated years (t) starting from long run period 
α LR  1  2  3  4  5 
95%  15.0%  15.6%  16.3%  16.9%  17.2%  17.4% 
99%  15.0%  15.8%  16.9%  17.7%  18.2%  18.5% 
99.9%  15.0%  16.1%  17.6%  18.8%  19.4%  19.8% 
In order to appraise the joint behavior of default rate and LGD by year, Figure 6 displays the 
positive correlation coming out from the simulation: this is essentially due to the collateral price 
common risk driver which affects both default and recovery rate.  
Figure 6: Correlation between HDRt (x-axis) and ELGDt (y-axis) over the five years of simulation. 
The assumptions are P(Po) = 35%,  ELGD = 15%, μ = 70%, μ o = 100%, σ = σPo = 50% 
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Thus, the graphical inspection presented here allows us to support that adverse dependencies 
between the two variables are correctly identified: their magnitude will depend on the one side on 
the VAR system coefficients (equation [3.1]), on the other on equation [4.3] which states the LGD 
– collateral value dependency. Furthermore, this framework makes it possible to identify, 
indirectly through simulation, downturn conditions (e.g. periods of negative GDP growth, lower 
collateral value and higher default rate) and transfer them into downturn LGD as pointed out by 
Tables 8 and 9. 
At 99.9%, as indicated by the last column of Table 8, the average downturn LGD is 17.4%, with 
an average downturn mark-up of 16% ranging from 2.1% during the first year to 25.3% at the fifth 
year: these figures are better shown in the last row of Table 9. 
Table 8: Downturn LGD computed with P(Po) = 35%,  ELGD = 15%, μ = 70%, μ o = 100%, σ = σPo = 50% 
α ELGD  1)(αDLGD   2)(αDLGD 3)(αDLGD 4)(αDLGD 5)(αDLGD   Average  )(αDLGD  
95%  15.0%  15.2%  15.8%  16.4%  16.8%  17.0%  16.2% 
99%  15.0%  15.3%  16.2%  17.0%  17.7%  17.8%  16.8% 
99.9%  15.0%  15.3%  16.5%  18.0%  18.3%  18.8%  17.4% 
Both )(αDLGD  and ν(α) are increasing with confidence level since, as α increases, the α quantile 
of the loss distribution ]|[ tYLqα  occurs at a more severe downturn tDLGD )(α , which also results 
in a larger LGD mark-up. As outlined in Barco (2007), the implication is that different downturn 
LGDs would be required for regulatory capital calculations done at 99.9% confidence and 
economic capital calculations with other confidence level. Another relevant feature to be 
highlighted is the enhancement of tDLGD )(α and ν(α)t with time (t), due to the higher probability 
of observing adverse chained scenarios, different from long run starting values. As the length of 
the simulation horizon is also consistent with the five years of data required by the regulator for 
LGD estimation, the choice of the last year result is probably the most prudential estimate, for a 
given confidence level, of the downturn effect. 
Table 9: LGD mark-up ν(α)t 
α ν(α)1  ν(α)2  ν(α)3  ν(α)4  ν(α)5  Average ν(α) 
95%  1.3%  5.6%  9.4%  11.8%  13.4%  8.3% 
99%  1.9%  8.1%  13.3%  17.9%  18.4%  11.9% 
99.9%  2.1%  9.8%  19.8%  22.3%  25.3%  15.9% 
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Table 10 outlines some further results using different ELGD values from 5% to 25%, leaving 
fixed the other parameters and setting α equal to 99.9%: as found by other empirical studies, the 
higher the ELGD, the lower the mark-up ν(α)t. For increasing ELGD values, the contribution of 
default rate in explaining the loss L|Yt becomes higher and thus reduces ν(α)t, also viewed as the 
systemic impact of LGD on the loss. As listed in the last column of table 10, the average mark-up 
computed across the five years decreases in fact from 59% to 7.3% whilst during the fifth year 
from 90% to 11%. 
Table 10: LGD mark-up computed for different value of ELGD at 99.9% percentile 
ELGD  ν(α)1  ν(α)2  ν(α)3  ν(α)4  ν(α)5  Average ν(α) 
5%  11.6%  40.5%  73.0%  80.2%  89.8%  59.0% 
10%  3.8%  17.7%  32.9%  37.1%  41.3%  26.6% 
15%  2.1%  9.8%  19.8%  22.3%  25.3%  15.9% 
20%  1.1%  6.1%  13.9%  14.7%  16.7%  10.5% 
25%  0.8%  4.4%  9.7%  10.4%  11.4%  7.3% 
Finally, in Table 11 some sensitivity tests were conducted, moving the average loan to value μ 
with a step of 10% from 50% to 80% and leaving unchanged all the other conditions (e.g. P(Po) = 
35%,  ELGD = 15%, μ o = 100%, σ = σPo = 50%, α = 99.9%): the main insight founded here is the 
negative, although negligible, relationship between μ and downturn effect. The latter appears in 
fact to be slightly more significant as the loans portfolio shows a better quality, that is a lower μ 
(the average magnitude is 16.3% when μ amounts to 50%). This tendency is explained by the 
steepness of P(Po | LTV) in [4.4], which depends positively on how much separate the Po and Po  
LTV groups are: the greater the difference in mean between the two, the higher the )%|( trePoP Δ  
volatility, causing a larger ELGDt systemic contribution. This feature is also consistent with the 
view according to which the level of conservatism tends to be higher for more secured portfolio, 
where possible shock to the collateral is likely to have significant effects on the LGD. 
Table 11: LGD mark-up computed for different values of μ and P(Po) 
P(Po)  μ ν(α)1  ν(α)2  ν(α)3  ν(α)4  ν(α)5  Average ν(α) 
30%  1.7%  8.0%  17.5%  19.0%  22.3%  13.7% 
35%  2.1%  10.0%  20.3%  23.0%  25.9%  16.3% 
40% 
50% 
2.7%  12.0%  23.0%  26.7%  29.3%  18.7% 
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P(Po)  μ ν(α)1  ν(α)2  ν(α)3  ν(α)4  ν(α)5  Average ν(α) 
30%  1.7%  8.0%  17.4%  18.9%  22.0%  13.6% 
35%  2.1%  10.0%  20.2%  22.8%  25.8%  16.2% 
40% 
60% 
2.7%  11.9%  22.9%  26.4%  29.1%  18.6% 
30%  1.7%  7.9%  17.3%  18.5%  21.3%  13.3% 
35%  2.1%  9.8%  19.8%  22.3%  25.3%  15.9% 
40% 
70% 
2.7%  11.8%  22.8%  25.8%  28.7%  18.3% 
30%  1.7%  7.7%  16.8%  17.9%  20.0%  12.8% 
35%  2.1%  9.5%  19.2%  21.2%  24.4%  15.3% 
40% 
80% 
2.7%  11.5%  22.2%  24.9%  27.9%  17.8% 
 
6. Conclusion 
The leading principle to be followed while validating downturn LGD is that its quantification 
should rely on incorporating into LGD estimates the adverse dependencies which are eventually 
identified between default rates and recovery rates. This should anyway be translated into the 
choice of the estimation method, which is heavily conditioned by data constraints.  
Literature on this subject usually concentrate on the analysis of correlations between observed 
system-wide corporate default rates and LGDs which are implicit in bonds prices after default. 
Banks internal series on workout LGD are in fact generally not long and complete enough to cover 
a full economic cycle, or at least a downturn period which can ensure reliable estimates of the 
relationship with internal default rates. Furthermore, the length of default, or the time span which 
elapses between the default event and the default termination, can be quite long for some 
countries, among which Italy, thus weakening the evidence of correlation. 
The present document describes a methodology for downturn effect estimation which still starts 
from the relation between LGD and DR: this is here derived implicitly, through the identification 
of common risk drivers, which can thus be simulated in order to get the paths of both variables 
under different economic conditions.  
While default rates are modeled inside a Vector Auto-Regressive system that links together 
several macroeconomic variables, whose parameters can be estimated on systemic data, the lack 
of workout LGD reliable time series prevents us from doing the same on recovery side. A 
theoretical Bayesian approach was then adopted in order to catch the effect of the macroeconomic 
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situation on LGD: as the focus of the analysis is the mortgage segment, the relevant driver is in 
this case the real estate price. 
The proposed framework, which puts together different techniques soundly based in the literature, 
has the advantage of  overcoming data constraints while still relying on a workout LGD concept as 
input. It is thus perfectly tailored on the mortgage portfolio, to which the alternative approach 
based on distressed bonds prices is not applicable, and whose relation with a specific macro 
impulse is intuitive. Its application could anyway be extended to other collateralized portfolios, if 
a specific theoretical model of their link to the economic cycle can be designed.  
The approach we describe in the paper aims to be fully consistent with the regulatory 
requirements: it is in fact based on identification of adverse dependencies between default rates 
and recovery rates, and it captures in downturn LGD all the risk coming from this correlation. 
Furthermore, as the downturn measure is to be used to feed the regulatory capital formulas, which 
do not account for systematic risk in LGD as on the contrary they implicitly do for PDs, we 
focused on the same 99.9% percentile at risk which is considered for the default probability 
parameter.  
As the approach is sufficiently general, it can serve not only to compute bank specific LGD 
parameters, but also to give benchmark values for estimates obtained through different 
approaches. This is why we chose to present the results for a range of different, but still realistic, 
assumptions on parameters values (we specifically refer here to average Loan to Value, average 
LGD, unconditional possession probability). This allows us to perceive the estimated downturn 
effect sensitivity to the parameters that are specific for each bank: in this regard, we found that the 
downturn LGD effect strongly decreases for increasing values of ELGD, while it is far less 
sensible to changes in the other parameters. For instance, if we consider the last year of the 
simulation to be the best estimate of the downturn effect, in order to allow the simulated economic 
system to fully display its effects, in the case of a portfolio with ELGD equal to 15%, the 
downturn mark up amounts to around 25%. 
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Appendix A 
Table A 1: Augmented-Dickey-Fuller unit root tests (1990Q2 – 2007Q4)  on variables 
included in VAR 
Critical values Variable  Lag  Statistic 
10%  5%  1% 
LHDR  3  ‐0.106  ‐2.57  ‐2.86  ‐3.43 
GDPdet  1  ‐2.211  ‐2.57  ‐2.86  ‐3.43 
ΔLog(RE)  2  ‐1.836  ‐2.57  ‐2.86  ‐3.43 
LogR3M  1  ‐1.800  ‐2.57  ‐2.86  ‐3.43 
Note: The null hypothesis is the presence of unit root. Akaike Info Criterion was used for lag selection. 
 
Table A 2: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  test for stationarity (1990Q2 – 2007Q4) on 
variables included in VAR  
Critical values Variable  Lag  Statistic 
10%  5%  1% 
LHDR  3  3.155***  0.347  0.463  0.739 
GDPdet  1  1.446***  0.347  0.463  0.739 
ΔLog(RE)  2  0.453*  0.347  0.463  0.739 
LogR3M  1  2.837***  0.347  0.463  0.739 
Note: The null hypothesis is the absence of unit root. * rejection at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% 
level 
 
Table A 3: Johansen cointegration rank test  on VAR with 3 time lags as in [3.1] 
n° of CE  Eingenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Prob 
None *  0.356  63.175  54.079  0.63% 
At most 1  0.219  33.238  35.192  8.00% 
At most 2  0.135  16.390  20.261  15.69% 
At most 3  0.091  6.4882  9.1645  15.62% 
Note: Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 
the 0.05 level. Tests are based on 2 lags Error Correction representation with LHDR, GDPdet, ΔLogRE), 
LogR3M  variables  and  restricted constant in the cointegrating equations.
 
Table A 4: Selection tests up to the fourth lag.  
Lag 
Akaike 
Iinformation 
citerion 
Final           
Prediction        
Error 
Shwarz        
Criterion 
Hannan        
Quinn 
0  ‐9.885  6.00E‐10  ‐8.9638  ‐9.5206 
1  ‐18.967  6.89E‐14  ‐17.519  ‐18.394 
2  ‐19.660  3.51E‐14  ‐17.685*  ‐18.878 
3  ‐19.914*  2.81e‐14*  ‐17.414  ‐18.925* 
4  ‐19.684  3.73E‐14  ‐16.656  ‐18.486 
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Figure A 1: Residuals of VAR system estimation. Time series plot 
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Table A 5: Normality test for residual et 
Residual (et)  Statistic  P‐value  Skewness  Kurtosis 
LHDR  1.1903  0.551  0.087  2.376 
GDPdet  0.1719  0.917  ‐0.06  2.789 
ΔLog(RE)  6.4259  0.040  0.193  4.455 
LogR3M  3.3934  0.183  0.450  3.622 
Note: P-value refers to the normality null hypothesis tested with Jarque-Bera test. 
 
Table A 6: Cholesky decomposition of Variance-Covariance et matrix 
  LHDR  GDPdet  ΔLog(RE)  LogR3M 
0.0948       
LHDR 
(0.0081)       
‐0.0007  0.0035     
GDPdet 
(0.0004)  (0.0003)     
0.0005  0.0000  0.0043   ΔLog(RE) 
(0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)   
‐0.0023  0.0120  0.0025  0.0551 
LogR3M 
(0.0069)  (0.0068)  (0.0067)  (0.0047) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. 
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